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Digital Forensics Report: The Crime — Android Mobile Device Forensics of a Homicide Victim

Digital Forensics Report: The Crime — Android Mobile Device Forensics of a Homicide Victim

Platform: CyberDefenders Challenge: The Crime Category: Endpoint Forensics Difficulty: Easy Tools: ALEAPP, DB Browser for SQLite, Linux Command Line Achievement: Proof of Completion

1. Executive Summary

Incident Type: Homicide Investigation / Mobile Device Forensics

Device: Android smartphone belonging to the victim

In this investigation, we are tasked with analyzing the mobile device of a homicide victim. Witness testimonies suggest the victim was heavily involved in trading, incurred massive debt, and exhibited unusual travel and communication patterns shortly before the incident. Our objective is to parse the Android file system using ALEAPP, reconstruct the victim’s activities from application data, SMS records, contact databases, and cached images, and document the digital evidence that connects the victim to key persons of interest, financial motive, and pre-incident travel plans.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

TypeIndicatorDescription
Trading App Packagecom.ticno.olymptradePrimary trading application installed on the device
APK SHA2564f168a77...e9df3cCryptographic hash of the base.apk installation file
Creditor Phone+201172137258Phone number of the aggressive debt collector
Creditor NameShady WahabContact saved in the victim’s address book
Debt Amount250,000Monetary value demanded in threatening SMS
Location (Sep 20)The Nile Ritz-CarltonVictim’s location per Google Maps snapshot
Booked FlightEgypt Airlines → Las VegasBoarding pass found in /data/media/0/Download
Meeting VenueThe Mob MuseumArranged via Discord with user rob1ns0n.
Discord Contactrob1ns0n.Friend the victim arranged to meet in Las Vegas

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Overview

TacticTechniqueID
CollectionData from Local System — SMS DatabaseT1005
CollectionData from Local System — Contacts DatabaseT1005
DiscoveryFile and Directory Discovery — APK EnumerationT1083
CollectionScreen Capture — Android Recent Apps SnapshotsT1113
CollectionData from Information Repositories — Discord Chat LogsT1213

2. Background: Key Android Forensic Artifacts

Before diving into the analysis, it is essential to understand the Android file system structure and the key artifact locations that make mobile forensics possible. Unlike Windows forensics where evidence is scattered across the registry, event logs, and prefetch files, Android centralizes most forensic evidence in SQLite databases and cached media files.

ArtifactFile System LocationForensic Value
Installed APKs/data/app/<package>/base.apkIdentifies all applications installed on the device; APK hashing enables integrity verification and malware detection
SMS Messages/data/user_de/0/com.android.providers.telephony/databases/mmssms.dbComplete text message history — timestamps, sender/receiver, read status, message body
Contacts/data/data/com.android.providers.contacts/databases/contacts2.dbMaps phone numbers to display names — critical for correlating anonymous numbers to known individuals
Recent Apps Snapshots/data/system_ce/0/snapshots/<task_id>/Visual screenshots taken automatically when apps are backgrounded — preserves the exact screen state at a specific moment
Downloads/data/media/0/Download/User-downloaded files: tickets, receipts, documents, images — often contains travel and financial evidence
Third-Party App Data/data/data/<package>/databases/Each app maintains its own SQLite database — Discord, WhatsApp, Telegram all store chat history locally

Why this matters: A single Android device can reconstruct a person’s complete digital life — who they talked to, what they said, where they were, what apps they used, and what they were looking at. The key forensic skill is knowing which databases to query and how to correlate data across them. ALEAPP (Android Logs Events And Protobuf Parser) automates much of this parsing, but understanding the underlying data model is essential for interpreting results correctly.

Tool Note — ALEAPP: ALEAPP is an open-source Android forensic parser that processes a full file system extraction and generates an HTML report with parsed artifacts organized by category (SMS, Contacts, Installed Apps, etc.). It supports hundreds of artifact types and is the standard tool for Android mobile forensics alongside Autopsy and Cellebrite.


3. Phase 1: Identifying the Trading Application (Question 1)

Objective: Identify the SHA256 hash of the trading application the victim primarily used.

Android applications are installed as .apk files, typically stored in the /data/app/ directory under their specific reverse-domain package name. By analyzing the installed applications via ALEAPP’s package parsing module or manual file system browsing, we identified a package named com.ticno.olymptrade — the Olymp Trade financial trading platform.

Why this finding matters for the investigation: The presence of a trading application on the victim’s phone corroborates the witness testimony about heavy trading involvement. Combined with the debt evidence we will uncover in Phase 2, this establishes the financial dimension of the case.

To verify the file and obtain its unique cryptographic signature, we navigated to the application’s directory in the extracted file system using the terminal and hashed the core installation file (base.apk) using the sha256sum utility.

Command Used:

1
sha256sum base.apk

Command Explanation:

  • sha256sum — Computes the SHA-256 cryptographic hash of a file, producing a unique 64-character hexadecimal string. Even a single byte change in the file would produce a completely different hash. This makes it the standard method for uniquely identifying and verifying the integrity of any file in digital forensics.

Terminal output showing the sha256sum command executed against the base.apk file of the com.ticno.olymptrade package, returning the full SHA256 hash 4f168a772350f283a1c49e78c1548d7c2c6c05106d8b9feb825fdc3466e9df3c — cryptographically identifying the trading application.

Analyst Note: Hashing application binaries is a fundamental forensic step. The SHA256 hash serves as a digital fingerprint — it can be submitted to VirusTotal or compared against known-good application hashes to verify integrity and rule out trojanized versions. If the hash does not match the official Olymp Trade APK, the victim may have been using a modified (potentially malicious) version of the app.

Answer Q1

What is the SHA256 hash of the trading application?

4f168a772350f283a1c49e78c1548d7c2c6c05106d8b9feb825fdc3466e9df3c


4. Phase 2: Financial Motive — SMS & Contact Analysis (Questions 2 & 3)

Objective: Determine the debt amount and identify the creditor threatening the victim.

Quantifying the Debt

Native text messages (SMS) on Android are stored in the Telephony Provider database, specifically mmssms.db (usually located at /data/user_de/0/com.android.providers.telephony/databases/). This database contains every sent and received text message with timestamps, phone numbers, read/unread status, and the full message body.

Why SMS forensics is critical: In criminal investigations, SMS messages are often the most direct evidence of motive, threats, and relationships. Unlike encrypted messaging apps (Signal, WhatsApp), native SMS is stored unencrypted in a standard SQLite database, making it trivially accessible to forensic tools.

Using ALEAPP to parse the SMS logs, we examined messages matching the witness’s timeline of aggressive threatening communications. We located an unread, incoming message demanding repayment. The sender explicitly states the monetary value required — 250,000.

ALEAPP SMS parser output showing an incoming, unread text message from phone number +201172137258 demanding repayment of 250,000 in an aggressive, threatening tone — establishing the financial motive for the homicide investigation.

Identifying the Creditor: Cross-Database Correlation

In digital forensics, correlation across databases is the technique that transforms raw data into actionable intelligence. From the SMS analysis, we identified the threatening message originated from the phone number +201172137258. A phone number alone is useful, but a name attached to that number is transformative.

To map this number to a human identity, we analyzed the Android Contacts database (contacts2.db located at /data/data/com.android.providers.contacts/databases/). By querying this database using ALEAPP’s Contacts parsing module for that specific phone number, we found the display name the victim had saved for this individual: Shady Wahab.

ALEAPP Contacts parser showing the contact entry for phone number +201172137258 with the display name Shady Wahab — the person the victim owed money to, directly correlating the threatening SMS to a named individual.

Why this correlation matters: The fact that the victim had this number saved under a name — not just stored as a raw phone number — proves a pre-existing personal relationship. The victim knew their creditor by name. This eliminates the possibility that the threats came from a random scammer or unknown entity, and directly supports the witness testimony about a personal debt.

Analyst Note: Cross-referencing phone numbers between the SMS database and the Contacts database is a standard forensic correlation technique. The contact name assigned by the victim themselves provides critical context — it confirms the victim knew the creditor personally, not just as an unknown caller.

Answer Q2

How much money does the victim owe?

250000

Answer Q3

What is the name of the person to whom the victim owes money?

Shady Wahab


5. Phase 3: Location Intelligence — Google Maps Snapshot (Question 4)

Objective: Determine where the victim was located when they departed their residence on September 20, 2023.

Understanding Recent Apps Snapshots

Android devices frequently take “snapshots” of an application’s screen right before the app is pushed to the background. These cached images are used to create the smooth visual transition in the “Recent Apps” menu and are stored in the device’s system directory.

Why snapshots are forensic goldmines: These images are highly valuable forensic artifacts because they preserve the exact state of an application at the moment the user switched away from it. Unlike GPS coordinates in location databases (which can be turned off), these visual snapshots capture what the user was actively viewing — including maps, conversations, and web pages — regardless of location service settings. The user has no control over their creation and is typically unaware they exist.

In ALEAPP, we examined the Application/Packages data for Google Maps (com.google.android.apps.maps). The system retained a snapshot image (6.jpg) taken on September 20. Viewing this image reveals the exact location the victim was viewing or navigating from on the map interface.

ALEAPP application snapshot metadata showing the cached Recent Apps image for Google Maps (com.google.android.apps.maps) with a timestamp of September 20, 2023 — the system captured the map view at the exact moment the victim switched away from the app.

Google Maps screenshot recovered from the Android device's Recent Apps cache showing the victim's location pinned at The Nile Ritz-Carlton hotel in Cairo, Egypt — establishing the victim's physical location on September 20, 2023.

Why this is significant for the investigation: The victim was at a luxury five-star hotel on September 20 — while simultaneously owing 250,000 in debt. This contradiction between financial distress and luxury accommodation could indicate the victim was living beyond their means, or that they had a specific purpose for being at this location (a meeting, a transaction, or an attempt to flee).

Analyst Note: Recent Apps snapshots are an often-overlooked forensic goldmine. Unlike GPS coordinates in location databases (which can be turned off), these visual snapshots capture what the user was actively viewing — including maps, conversations, and web pages — regardless of location service settings. Always check the snapshots directory even when location services were disabled.

Answer Q4

Where was the victim located on September 20?

The Nile Ritz-Carlton


6. Phase 4: Travel Intelligence — Boarding Pass Recovery (Question 5)

Objective: Identify where the victim intended to travel based on a booked flight.

Flight tickets, boarding passes, and travel receipts are commonly downloaded to the device via browsers, email attachments, or messaging apps. These files typically land in the device’s user media storage — specifically the /data/media/0/Download directory.

Why the Download directory matters: This is the default location for all user-initiated downloads on Android. It is the forensic equivalent of a person’s desk drawer — it accumulates receipts, documents, images, and files that the user intentionally saved. Unlike app caches (which may be auto-purged), downloaded files persist until manually deleted.

By manually traversing the extracted file system to the Download folder, we discovered an image file named Plane Ticket.png. Opening this image revealed a boarding pass for Egypt Airlines showing the destination city.

Recovered boarding pass image (Plane Ticket.png) from the victim's Download folder showing an Egypt Airlines flight with the destination clearly printed as Las Vegas — establishing the victim's planned travel itinerary shortly before the incident.

Answer Q5

Where did the victim intend to travel?

Las Vegas


7. Phase 5: Communication Intelligence — Discord Chat Analysis (Question 6)

Objective: Determine where the victim arranged to meet a friend via Discord.

Why Third-Party App Forensics Is Different

Third-party applications like Discord do not use the native Android SMS database. They maintain their own independent SQLite databases or cache files to store chat history locally on the device. This means SMS parsers will miss these communications entirely — a dedicated parser or manual database inspection is required.

Why this distinction matters: If an examiner only parses the native SMS and call logs, they will have an incomplete picture of the victim’s communications. In modern mobile forensics, the majority of interpersonal communication happens through third-party apps (Discord, WhatsApp, Telegram, Signal, Instagram DMs) — not native SMS. Failing to parse these databases creates critical intelligence gaps.

ALEAPP includes a dedicated parser for Discord chats. By reviewing the parsed Discord communications within the report, we identified a conversation between the victim and another user (rob1ns0n.) where they finalize their meetup plans, explicitly naming the venue: The Mob Museum in Las Vegas.

ALEAPP Discord chat parser output showing a conversation between the victim and the user rob1ns0n. where they arrange to meet at The Mob Museum in Las Vegas — correlating the booked flight destination with a planned in-person meeting.

Analyst Note: The correlation between the booked flight (Las Vegas) and the Discord meetup location (The Mob Museum, Las Vegas) is significant. This establishes a clear chain: the victim planned to travel to Las Vegas specifically to meet this Discord contact, providing investigators with a secondary lead to pursue.

Answer Q6

Where did the victim arrange to meet a friend via Discord?

The Mob Museum


8. Reconstructed Investigation Timeline

Based on all artifacts recovered from the device, we can reconstruct the victim’s final activities and the investigative narrative that connects trading, debt, threats, and travel plans:

DateArtifact SourceEventInvestigative Significance
Pre-incidentInstalled APKs (/data/app/)Victim installs and actively uses Olymp Trade financial trading appCorroborates witness testimony about heavy trading involvement
Pre-incidentSMS Database (mmssms.db)Shady Wahab (+201172137258) sends threatening message demanding 250,000 repaymentEstablishes financial motive — the victim was under aggressive pressure from a known creditor
Sep 20, 2023Recent Apps Snapshot (Google Maps)Victim is at The Nile Ritz-Carlton, CairoPlaces victim at a luxury hotel despite severe debt — contradicts financial distress
Pre-departureDownload directory (/data/media/0/Download/)Boarding pass recovered: Egypt Airlines → Las VegasVictim planned international travel — potential flight from creditors or a planned meeting
Pre-departureDiscord chat databaseConversation with rob1ns0n.: arranged to meet at The Mob Museum, Las VegasConfirms Las Vegas trip had a specific purpose — a planned in-person meeting
Post-incidentPhysical evidenceVictim found deceasedAll digital evidence now serves to reconstruct motive, relationships, and final movements

Investigative Correlation: The timeline reveals a clear narrative arc: the victim accumulated debt through trading (Olymp Trade) → was threatened by their creditor (Shady Wahab, 250,000) → was at a luxury hotel despite being in debt (Nile Ritz-Carlton, Sep 20) → booked a flight to Las Vegas → planned to meet someone at The Mob Museum. Whether the victim was attempting to flee, meet someone who could help with the debt, or had other intentions — the digital evidence provides investigators with a complete picture of the victim’s final plans.


9. Conclusion

The Crime investigation demonstrates how Android mobile device forensics can reconstruct a victim’s final activities, financial relationships, and travel plans from native system artifacts and third-party application data. Key findings:

  1. Trading Activity: The victim used Olymp Trade (com.ticno.olymptrade) — confirmed via APK hashing with sha256sum.
  2. Financial Motive: SMS analysis revealed a 250,000 debt owed to Shady Wahab (+201172137258), with threatening messages demanding repayment.
  3. Location on Sep 20: Google Maps Recent Apps snapshot placed the victim at The Nile Ritz-Carlton in Cairo.
  4. Travel Plans: A boarding pass in the Download folder confirmed an Egypt Airlines flight to Las Vegas.
  5. Discord Meetup: Chat logs revealed a planned meeting with rob1ns0n. at The Mob Museum in Las Vegas.

Key Takeaways for the SOC:

  1. ALEAPP is indispensable for Android forensics — it automates the parsing of hundreds of artifact types including SMS, contacts, app snapshots, and third-party chat databases, dramatically accelerating mobile investigations.
  2. Recent Apps snapshots are forensic goldmines — they preserve visual evidence of what the user was viewing at specific moments, even when location services are disabled or GPS data is unavailable.
  3. Third-party app databases require dedicated parsers — Discord, WhatsApp, Telegram, and Signal all store chat data in their own SQLite databases, not in the native SMS provider. Always parse application-specific databases to avoid intelligence gaps.
  4. Cross-database correlation is essential — linking phone numbers from SMS logs to the Contacts database transforms anonymous threats into named suspects with actionable investigative leads.

Analysis Date: June 13, 2026 Analyst: El OMARI Zakaria

This post is licensed under CC BY 4.0 by the author.